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ARTICLE 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
WATER SUPPLY AND LAND USE 
PLANNING: LEADING CASES UNDER 
THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY ACT 
JAMES G. MOOSE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the last fifteen years or so, the relationship between land use 
planning and water supply development has received considerable 
attention in the California Legislature and in California Supreme Court 
and court of appeal decisions interpreting the California Environmental 
Quality Act (“CEQA”).1 The relevant legislation and case law direct 
cities and counties, when acting as CEQA lead agencies for substantial 
land use projects, to work with water suppliers to assess the availability 
of water for such projects in light of other anticipated demands. As 
California struggles to contend with both its growing human population 
and its increasing environmental challenges, local agencies must be 
careful not to approve new development at levels that cannot be 
* Jim Moose is the senior partner in Remy, Thomas, Moose and Manley, LLP, where he has 
practiced for nearly 25 years, with a focus on advising public and private clients with respect to 
issues arising under the California Environmental Act (CEQA), Planning and Zoning Law, and 
various other state and federal environmental laws. Along with his partner Whitman F. Manley and 
former partner Tina A. Thomas, he is co-author of Guide to the California Environmental Quality 
Act, a respected legal treatise frequently cited by the appellate courts. Over the last two decades, he 
has also participated in drafting amendments to CEQA and the CEQA Guidelines. 
 1 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE, § 21000 et seq. (Westlaw 2010). 
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adequately served with dependable long-term water supplies. 
In 1995, in legislation commonly known as “SB 901,” the 
Legislature created a process whereby cities and counties approving 
certain types of large development projects were required to seek “water 
supply assessments” (WSA) from the “public water systems” responsible 
for serving such projects with water. These assessments were intended to 
inform the preparation of the environmental documents for the 
development projects.2 In 2001, in legislation commonly known as “SB 
610,” the Legislature closed some of the perceived loopholes in the 
original WSA mechanism and altered some of the procedures created by 
SB 901.3 At the same time, the Legislature, through parallel legislation 
known as “SB 221,” created what has been called a “fail-safe” procedure 
mandating that, before a city or county can approve a final subdivision 
map for a residential project that will include more than 500 dwelling 
units, the city or county must first receive from the applicable water 
supplier a written verification of the availability of a water supply for the 
project.4 
Even before the Legislature created water supply assessment and 
verification requirements,5 the courts began to grapple with how land use 
and water supply planning should be coordinated through the 
adjudication of CEQA cases related to substantial development projects. 
These cases have created a body of law that complements, but is 
independent of, the requirements of SB 610 and SB 221. 
The most significant judicial event on the subject of CEQA and 
water supply in recent years was the California Supreme Court’s 
issuance in early 2007 of its decision in Vineyard Area Citizens for 
Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova.6 In its first opinion 
since 1988 addressing the adequacy of an environmental impact report 
 
 2 1995 Cal. Stat. 6701. 
 3 See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10915 (Westlaw 2010); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151.9; 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15155 (2010). 
                   4 Although “subdivision,” for purposes of this requirement, generally means a subdivision 
creating more than 500 dwelling units, in situations in which a water supplier (“public water 
system”) is a relatively small entity, the requirement applies to “any residential development that 
would account for an increase of 10 percent or more in the number of the public water system’s 
existing service connections.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66473.7(a)(1) (Westlaw 2010). Furthermore, in-
fill and low-income housing projects are excluded from the requirement, regardless of the number of 
units involved. Id. § 66473.7(i). 
 5 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21159.1; CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-10915; CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 66473.7. 
 6 Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 
4th 412 (2007). 
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(EIR), the high court set forth a set of principles, derived from over a 
decade of court of appeal case law, governing the manner in which cities 
and counties must address water-related issues in land use EIRs. 
This Article will survey and analyze this 2007 California Supreme 
Court decision and the key appellate court cases leading up to and 
following it, all of which address the relationship between land use 
planning and water supply planning under CEQA. The Article will also 
address a subsequent California Supreme Court decision addressing the 
adequacy of the EIR for one of the most significant water supply 
programs in recent decades, the so-called CALFED Record of Decision, 
which reflected, as of the year 2000, a long-term strategy for addressing 
ecological problems occurring in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River 
Delta while increasing the reliability of southbound water exports from 
that water body.7 Lessons from the case law as it currently exists may be 
broadly described as follows: 
1) According to CEQA case law (as opposed to SB 610 and SB 221), 
EIRs for substantial development projects should analyze the 
availability of existing or realistically available water supplies for 
proposed development, and cannot get by simply by identifying 
theoretical water rights or contract rights that may be very difficult to 
translate into actual water for human use within any foreseeable time 
frame. “CEQA’s informational purposes are not satisfied by an EIR 
that simply ignores or assumes a solution to the problem of supplying 
water to a proposed land use project. Decision makers must, under the 
law, be presented with sufficient facts to ‘evaluate the pros and cons 
of supplying the amount of water that the [project] will need.’” 8 The 
focus of the analysis should be on whether particular supplies “bear a 
likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and 
unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient bases for 
decisionmaking under CEQA.”9 
 
2) “If the uncertainties inherent in long-term land use and water 
planning make it impossible to confidently identify the future water 
sources, an EIR may satisfy CEQA if it acknowledges the degree of 
uncertainty involved, discusses the reasonably foreseeable 
 7 In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 43 Cal. 4th 
1143 (2008). 
 8 Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 40 Cal. 4th at 431 (quoting Santiago 
County Water Dist. v. County of Orange, 118 Cal. App. 3d 818, 829 (Ct. App. 1981)). 
 9 Id. at 432 (quoting Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles 
(SCOPE I), 106 Cal. App. 4th 715, 720-23 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
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alternatives—including alternative water sources and the option of 
curtailing the development if sufficient water is not available for later 
phases—and discloses the significant foreseeable environmental 
effects of each alternative, as well as mitigation measures to minimize 
each adverse impact.”10 
 
3) EIRs for substantial development projects should also analyze or 
disclose the physical impacts associated with obtaining new water 
supplies for development projects.11 
 
4) Finally, EIRs for land use plans should formulate mitigation 
measures that prevent physical development from occurring before 
water supplies are physically available for delivery, though land use 
plans may be approved without all of the water necessary for build-out 
being immediately available. However, “[t]he  law’s informational 
demands may not be met, in this context, simply by providing that 
future development will not proceed if the anticipated water supply 
fails to materialize. But when an EIR makes a sincere and reasoned 
attempt to analyze the water sources the project is likely to use, but 
acknowledges the remaining uncertainty, a measure for curtailing 
development if the intended sources fail to materialize may play a role 
in the impact analysis.”12 
II. LEADING CEQA CASES INVOLVING WATER SUPPLY AND LAND 
USE PLANNING 
The first notable appellate court decision to address the interplay 
between CEQA and water supply issues was Santiago County Water 
District v. County of Orange, decided in 1981, involving a proposed 
sand-and-gravel mining project.13 There, the court considered a project-
level EIR that contained limited analysis of the project’s water supply 
needs and impacts.14 Fifteen years later, the court of appeal decision in 
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus dealt with 
water supply issues in a broader land use planning context.15 Five years 
after that decision, another appellate court in Napa Citizens for Honest 
 
 10 Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 40 Cal. 4th at 434. 
 11 Id. at 431 (citing Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 
4th 182, 206 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
 12 Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 40 Cal. 4th at 432. 
 13 Santiago County Water Dist., 118 Cal. App. 3d 818. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182. 
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Government v. Napa County Board of Supervisors added nuances to the 
discussion in Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project.16 
In addition to grappling with the timing of water supply and land 
use planning, courts have also been forced to address the uncertainties 
inherent in California water law, drought supplies, and delivery 
infrastructure, as well as the impacts of these and other uncertainties on 
effective water supply planning and environmental review.17 For 
instance, the decisions in Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the 
Environment v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I) and California Oak 
Foundation v. City of Santa Clarita involved water suppliers’ reliance on 
uncertain State Water Project (“SWP”) “entitlements,” and, more 
specifically, a single water transfer for the annual contract rights to up to 
41,000 acre-feet of water from the SWP, some portion of which was 
“paper water.”18 These cases teach that, at least in some instances, EIRs 
for development projects partly dependent on SWP supplies must 
disclose the fact that SWP “entitlements” are not the same as actual 
supplies.19 
In early 2007, the California Supreme Court finally weighed in on 
all of these points, issuing the landmark opinion in Vineyard Area 
Citizens for Responsible Growth.20 In its decision, the court reviewed 
and considered the prior court of appeal case law and drew together the 
different strands into a single set of principles governing the preparation 
of water supply analyses in land use EIRs.21 In late 2007, the court of 
appeal decision in Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the 
Environment v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE II), applying standards 
announced in Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, handed 
the first published appellate victory to a respondent agency in the series 
of cases involving the above-referenced 41,000-acre-feet water 
22transfer.  
 
 16 Napa Citizens for Honest Gov’t v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors, 91 Cal. App. 4th 342 
t. Ap(C p. 2001). 
 17 See, e.g., Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t. v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I), 
106 Cal. App. 4th 715 (Ct. App. 2003); Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th 
1219 ( t. App. 20C 05). 
id. 
rd Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 
). 
 18 See 
 19 Id. 
 20 Vineya
4th 412 (2007
 21 Id. 
 22 Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE II), 157 Cal. 
App. 4th 149 (Ct. App. 2007); see also Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water 
Agency, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373 (Ct. App. 2002) (setting aside EIR for 41,000 acre feet transfer); 
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Finally, in June 2008, the California Supreme Court issued its long-
awaited decision entitled In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, in which the court upheld a 
program EIR for a thirty-year program for various actions associated 
with the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta.23 Although this last 
decision addresses an EIR for a water supply/ecosystem restoration 
program rather than an EIR for a land use plan,24 the decision is 
nevertheless relevant to the interplay between water supply planning and 
land use planning. 
Each of these precedent-setting cases is discussed in detail below. 
A.  SANTIAGO WATER DISTRICT V. COUNTY OF ORANGE 
In Santiago Water District v. County of Orange,25 a county water 
district challenged the approval of an EIR for a proposed sand and gravel 
mining operation.26 The EIR contained no information demonstrating 
that any water supplier had agreed to provide water to the project, and no 
analysis regarding the environmental effects of any such water delivery 
and usage.27 The respondent county nevertheless found the EIR to be 
adequate and approved the project subject to the condition that the 
operator subsequently establish an adequate water supply for the 
project.28 
The court of appeal found merit in the petitioner’s challenge, stating 
that in general, an EIR “‘should be prepared with a sufficient degree of 
analysis to provide decision makers with information which enables 
them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of 
environmental consequences.’”29 Here, the EIR failed to provide 
sufficient information about the delivery of water to the proposed mining 
site, and it did not include any description of the facilities that would 
 
SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th 715 (setting aside EIR for land use plan reliant on same transfer); Cal. 
Oak Found., 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219 (setting aside another EIR for land use project reliant on 
transfer).  But cf. Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 180 Cal. App. 4th 
210 (Ct. App. 2009) (upholding second EIR for proposed transfer, prepared on remand from Friends 
of the Santa Clara River, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373). 
 23 In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 43 Cal. 4th 
1143 (2008). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Santiago Water Dist. v. County of Orange, 118 Cal. App. 3d 818 (Ct. App. 1981). 
 26 Id. at 822. 
 27 Id. at 830-32. 
 28 Id. at 828. 
 29 Id. at 831 (quoting CEQA Guidelines, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15150). 
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 that legislation.  
 
have to be constructed to deliver water to the project.30 The court noted 
that, because the construction of additional water-delivery facilities was 
“undoubtedly one of the significant environmental effects of the project,” 
“a description of the necessary construction had to be included if the EIR 
was to serve its informational purpose.”31 Also, while the EIR did state 
that a large quantity of water would be consumed by the project, the EIR 
did not include any discussion of the environmental impacts of supplying 
such a large quantity of water.32 Nor did the document address the 
effects of that delivery on water service elsewhere in the water district’s 
jurisdiction.33 For these reasons, the court concluded that the EIR was 
inadequate.34 
B. STANISLAUS NATURAL HERITAGE PROJECT V. COUNTY OF 
STANISLAUS 
In Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus,35 
the court of appeal not only addressed the need for local agencies to 
identify future water supply sources before approving large new 
development projects, but also announced principles requiring such 
agencies to consider the environmental effects of developing new supply 
sources.36 In this respect, the opinion goes beyond the requirements of 
SB 610 and SB 221 and creates CEQA obligations that apply to a 
universe of projects that includes, but extends further than, the kinds of 
projects subject to 37
In Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project, the court of appeal 
invalidated an EIR for a specific plan because the document had not 
adequately dealt with the environmental consequences associated with 
acquiring a long-term water supply for the proposed development.38 The 
specific plan would allow 5,000 residential units on 29,500 acres to be 
built in four phases over twenty-five years.39 The EIR evaluated the 
 30 Santiago Water Dist., 118 Cal. App. 3d at 829. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 830-32. 
 34 Id. at 829. 
 35 Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182 (Ct. 
App. 1996). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 187. 
 39 Id. at 186. 
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effects related to providing water during the first five years of the fifteen-
year first phase, but it did not address impacts that would occur beyond 
that initial period.40 Instead, the document treated the potential long-term 
water supply shortfall as a significant and unavoidable impact, but it 
identified as “mitigation” a commitment that further construction, 
beyond the first increment, could not occur unless adequate water 
supplies could be found.41 The EIR also stated that additional 
environmental review would be required in connection with future water-
acquisition projects serving such future development.42 
In holding that the EIR was inadequate, the court stated that “the 
County’s approval of the project under these circumstances defeated a 
fundamental purpose of CEQA: to ‘inform the public and responsible 
officials of the environmental consequences of their decisions before 
they are made.’”43 The court rejected the respondent agency’s argument 
that, because the EIR was only a “first tier” document, to be augmented 
in the future with additional negative declarations or EIRs, the county 
was not required to analyze long-term water supply impacts to the degree 
advocated by the petitioners.44 The court explained that: 
a decision to “tier” environmental review does not excuse a 
governmental entity from complying with CEQA’s mandate to 
prepare, or cause to be prepared, an environmental impact report on 
any project that may have a significant effect on the environment, with 
that report to include a detailed statement setting forth “[a]ll 
significant effects on the environment of the proposed project.”45 
Even though the respondent and applicant recognized, in effect, that 
large portions of the project might not be built should water supplies not 
be forthcoming, the willingness to bear that risk was no substitute for 
proper CEQA compliance.46 The approval of a specific plan embodies a 
decision to encourage or permit the full complement of development 
contemplated by the plan.47 The EIR for such a specific plan should 
therefore look at water issues assuming full build-out: 
 40 Id. at 194-95. 
 41 Id. at 195. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. (quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 6 Cal. 4th 1112, 1123 (1993)). 
 44 Id. at 197. 
 45 Id. (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100). 
 46 Id. at 199. 
 47 Id. 
8
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol4/iss1/4
03_MOOSE PRINTER VERSION (FINAL) 10/11/2010  10:05:42 AM 
2010] WATER SUPPLY AND LAND USE PLANNING 35 
 
 
No matter what subsequent environmental review might take place, 
and no matter what additional mitigation measures might be adopted 
to ameliorate adverse environmental impacts on each of the four 
“phases” of planned development, the project was going to need water 
from some source or sources.  To defer any analysis whatsoever of the 
impacts of supplying water to this project until after the adoption of 
the specific plan calling for the project to be built would appear to be 
putting the cart before the horse.48 
The court made the following statements regarding what steps the 
respondent would have to take to comply with CEQA: 
  We are not concluding respondent must first find a source of water 
for the “project” before an EIR will be adequate. We are concluding 
that an EIR for this project must address the impact of supplying water 
for the project. It is not mitigation of a significant environmental 
impact on a project to say that if the impact is not addressed then the 
project will not be built. The decision not to build may well rest upon 
the absence of a suitable or adequate water source. However, the 
decision to approve the EIR of this project does require recognition 
that water must be supplied, that it will come from a specific source or 
one of several possible sources, of what the impact will be if supplied 
from a particular source or possible sources and if that impact is 
adverse how it will be addressed. While it might be argued that not 
building a portion of the project is the ultimate mitigation, it must be 
borne in mind that the EIR must address the project and assumes the 
project will be built.49 
Notably, like SB 610,50 the Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project 
decision stops short of prohibiting legislative land use approvals in the 
absence of a guaranteed water supply sufficient for full buildout. 
Furthermore, the decision required that a specific plan EIR address the 
environmental impacts associated with developing whatever new water 
sources would be needed to serve the planned development.51 
This latter directive, though perhaps arguably always implicit in 
CEQA principles, required a departure from prior standard practice, as 
witnessed by the author in the decade preceding the decision. Before the 
Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project decision was issued in 1996, land 
 48 Id. at 199-200. 
 49 Id. at 205-06 (emphasis added). 
 50 CAL. WATER CODE § 10911 (Westlaw 2010). 
 51 Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 205-06. 
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use EIRs had very seldom gone beyond merely identifying potential 
water sources. In the aftermath of the decision, however, land use EIRs, 
at least in some instances, were required to focus on the question of 
whether the use of surface water or groundwater in new development 
could harm distant fisheries or aquifers.52 
C. NAPA CITIZENS FOR HONEST GOVERNMENT V. NAPA COUNTY 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
In Napa Citizens for Honest Government v. Napa County Board of 
Supervisors, 53 petitioners challenged a Final Subsequent EIR (“FSEIR”) 
and specific plan prepared by Napa County to facilitate the industrial 
development of an unincorporated area south of the City of Napa.54 
Petitioners alleged, among other things, that the FSEIR failed to 
adequately analyze and mitigate identified significant impacts regarding 
water distribution.55 The court agreed.56 
The court characterized as follows the manner in which the FSEIR 
dealt with water issues: 
[T]he FSEIR assumes that water to the Project area will be supplied in 
the future, as it is supplied now, by [the City of] American Canyon.  
American Canyon receives water from the State Water Project via the 
North Bay Aqueduct. The FSEIR reports that at present, American 
Canyon uses less than one-half of the amount of water allocated to it, 
but it appears that by the year 2015, the combined needs of the city 
and the Project will exceed American Canyon’s aqueduct allotment. 
The FSEIR further reports that American Canyon is in the process of 
reaching an agreement with the City of Vallejo that will permit 
American Canyon to purchase additional water from a water treatment 
facility in that nearby town. The FSEIR assumes that this water will 
prevent the anticipated shortfall. It therefore concludes that the 
Project’s demand for water will not result in a significant effect.57 
The court then discussed the applicable legal principles derived 
from prior case law: 
 52 See, e.g., Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182. 
 53 Napa Citizens for Honest Gov’t v. Napa County Bd. of Supervisors, 91 Cal. App. 4th 342 
(Ct. App. 2001). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 354. 
 56 Id. at 375. 
 57 Id. at 372. 
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  It has been held that an EIR is inadequate if it fails to identify at 
least a potential source for water. In Stanislaus Natural Heritage 
Project v. County of Stanislaus, (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 182, for 
example, the failure to identify a source of water beyond the first five 
years of development rendered the EIR inadequate, although the 
developer was pursuing several possible sources. It also has been held 
that an EIR is inadequate if the project intends to use water from an 
existing source, but it is not shown that the existing source has enough 
water to serve the project and the current users. (Santiago County 
Water Dist. v. County of Orange (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 818.) On the 
other hand, it has been held that an EIR is not required to engage in 
speculation in order to analyze a “worst case scenario.” (Towards 
Responsibility in Planning v. City Council (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 671 
(hereafter TRIP).) In that case, the court held that an EIR was not 
required to analyze the effects that would result from the construction 
of a sewage treatment facility, when (1) all indications suggested that 
the facility would never be needed, and (2) the facility – if it was 
constructed – would be subjected to its own environmental review.58 
The court then applied these precedents to the situation before it: 
  The present situation falls somewhere between that at issue in TRIP 
on the one hand, and those in Stanislaus and Santiago, on the other.  
In TRIP, affected cities had entered into agreements designed to 
provide service sufficient to meet the project’s needs. In the present 
case, the necessary agreements have not yet been reached, and as the 
Project has no control over those agreements, it cannot ensure that 
they will be reached.  Unlike the EIR in Santiago, the FSEIR does 
consider the impact of the Project’s needs on the area’s resources and 
the ability of those resources to meet the demands of other users. 
Unlike the situation in Stanislaus, the FSEIR has identified sources for 
water and facilities for the treatment of wastewater, although their 
availability has not been absolutely established.  Moreover, the FSEIR 
analyzes the capacities of the existing systems and concludes that the 
anticipated resources, if available, will be able to handle the Project 
area’s needs for water and disposal of wastewater. 
 
  It follows that a compromise between the positions adopted in those 
cases is in order. We concluded that the FSEIR need not identify and 
analyze all possible resources that might serve the Project should the 
anticipated resources fail to materialize. Because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the anticipated sources for water and wastewater 
 58 Id. at 372-73. 
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treatment, however, the FSEIR also cannot simply label the possibility 
that they will not materialize as “speculative,” and decline to address 
it. The County should be informed if other sources exist, and be 
informed, in at least general terms, of the environmental consequences 
of tapping such resources. Without either such information or a 
guarantee that the resources now identified in the FSEIR will be 
available, the County simply cannot make a meaningful assessment of 
the potentially significant environmental impacts of the Project.59 
After explaining why the FSEIR had a flawed approach in its 
treatment of water supply impacts, the court next addressed the kind of 
“mitigation” that would have been appropriate under the circumstances: 
  [A]s we have found that the FSEIR is inadequate in failing either to 
identify new sources or to report that none is available, the FSEIR also 
is inadequate in failing to identify and analyze appropriate mitigation 
measures related to the alternative sources, if any. In theory, at least, 
the FSEIR also could state a mitigation measure that would prevent 
development if the identified sources fail to materialize.60 
The language italicized immediately above provides important 
guidance to local lead agencies faced with a temporary water supply 
shortfall at the time of project approval. A mitigation measure 
“prevent[ing] development” until “identified sources” of water 
“materialize” is a form of “phasing” of development. Well established in 
other contexts,61 such a strategy should ensure that actual physical 
development does not occur until such time as there is adequate water to 
serve it. Thus, where a city or county has identified a possible water 
source for new development, but that source is not yet certain to be 
available at the time of discretionary project approval, the city or county 
may approve the project subject to a mitigation measure that permits 
actual development only as water supplies become certain and reliable.62 
 59 Id. at 373-74. 
 60 Id. at 374 (emphasis added). 
 61 See, e.g., Mira Dev. Corp. of San Diego v. City of San Diego, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1201, 
1215-16 (Ct. App. 1988); Dateline Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 146 Cal. App. 3d 520, 529-
32 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 62 The Napa Citizens court’s enthusiasm for phasing as a legitimate form of mitigation 
provides a counterbalance to the seemingly sweeping language in Stanislaus Natural Heritage 
Project to the effect that “[i]t is not mitigation of a significant environmental impact on a project to 
say that if the impact is not addressed then the project will not be built.” Stanislaus Natural Heritage 
Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182, 205 (Ct. App. 1996). Read together, Napa 
Citizens and Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project should be understood to treat phasing as a 
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D.  SANTA CLARITA ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING THE 
ENVIRONMENT V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (SCOPE I) 
“An environmental impact report for a housing development must 
contain a thorough analysis that reasonably informs the reader of the 
amount of water available.” 63 With that succinct statement, the court in 
Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of 
Los Angeles (SCOPE I) cemented the CEQA requirement that an EIR for 
a substantial development project must address the adequacy of the water 
supply for the project. Further elucidated in Vineyard Area Citizens for 
Responsible Growth, this requirement is independent of statutory 
mandates requiring water suppliers to provide information to land use 
planning agencies.64 
The project at issue in SCOPE I was a mixed residential and 
commercial development composed of 2,545 dwelling units, 180,000 
square feet of commercial retail space, and 46 acres of community 
facilities.65 The Valencia Water Company (“Valencia”), a water retailer 
supplied by the Castaic Lake Water Agency (“Castaic”), a water 
wholesaler, was to provide water to the project.66 The EIR estimated that 
project would demand 2,194 acre-feet per year (AFY).67 
Castaic’s current supply was reported to be between 97,700 and 
106,700 AFY.68 The sources of Castaic’s supply included groundwater, 
recycled water, and 54,200 AFY of “current entitlements” from the 
SWP.69 Because Castaic’s water demand at that time was only 48,858 
AFY, the draft EIR concluded that there was sufficient water to meet the 
Project’s demand.70 Valencia was also reported to have sufficient water 
 
legitimate form of mitigation but an inadequate substitute, by itself, for an EIR’s failure to identify 
and analyze the likely sources of water for a proposed development project. See also Vineyard Area 
Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 4th 412, 432 (2007) (“[A] 
measure for curtailing development if the intended sources fail to materialize may play a role in the 
impact analysis.”); Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t. v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I), 
106 Cal. App. 4th 715, 723 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a mitigation measure requiring a showing 
of adequate water supplies prior to tract map recordation does not obviate the need for an EIR to 
fully analyze a project’s impacts on water supply). 
 63 Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I), 106 Cal. 
App. 4th 715, 717 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 64 Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, 40 Cal. 4th at 428, 432. 
 65 SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 718. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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to supply the Project.71 
In the discussion of cumulative impacts, however, the Draft EIR 
disclosed that buildout in the entire Santa Clarita Valley would result in a 
water shortage.72 The Draft EIR further claimed, though, that Castaic had 
the opportunity to purchase additional entitlements under the so-called 
“Monterey Agreement” between the California Department of Water 
Resources (DWR) and its contractors, and that these additional 
entitlements, along with water banking and other storage, would provide 
enough water for growth in the valley.73 The Draft EIR also determined 
that there would be no significant and unavoidable cumulative impacts 
because each project would be required to demonstrate water availability 
prior to construction.74 
Plaintiffs challenged the EIR’s adequacy, claiming that the EIR did 
not “state accurately the amount of water available.”75 As explained 
below, the court of appeal agreed. 
The court began its analysis by referring to passages in an earlier 
appellate decision, entitled Planning & Conservation League v. 
Department of Water Resources,76 explaining the difference between 
SWP paper “entitlements” and the amount of real water the SWP can 
actually deliver.77 In relevant part, the SCOPE I court noted that, because 
the SWP has never been completed, “there is a huge gap between what is 
promised [to holders of entitlements] and what can be delivered.”78 
 71 Id. at 719. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 719. 
 75 Id. at 720. 
 76 Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892, 908 (Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 77 SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 720-21. 
 78 Id. at 721 (quoting Planning & Conservation League, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 908). Planning 
& Conservation League involved the efforts of DWR and several of its large customers (water 
contractors) to modify the operations of the massive (but only partially completed) SWP. These 
agencies’ goals included making the SWP more efficient, and thus more dependable as a source of 
long-term water supplies for its vast service area, by eliminating standard contract provisions 
requiring agricultural contractors to forgo water deliveries during drought conditions before urban 
contractors were required to do so, and facilitating water transfers from agricultural to urban 
contractors. The proposed SWP operational modifications were embodied in the “Monterey 
Agreement.” 
Because the proposed Monterey Agreement was a project subject to CEQA, an EIR was 
necessary. Interestingly, the court of appeal, in finding the EIR inadequate, focused not on the 
impacts of the Monterey Agreement itself, but on impacts that might occur if it were not 
implemented. Specifically, the No Project Alternative was inadequate for failing to spell out the 
potential negative environmental consequences that might occur if DWR carried out the pre-existing 
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The court then explained that the purpose of an EIR “is to inform 
the public and its responsible officials of the environmental 
consequences of decisions before they are made.”79 “To be adequate, the 
EIR must include sufficient detail to enable those who did not participate 
in its preparation to understand and ‘meaningfully’ consider the issues 
raised by the proposed project.”80 
The EIR in this case relied heavily on SWP entitlements to 
demonstrate the sufficiency of water supplies for the project.81 The EIR 
made no attempt, however, “to calculate or even discuss the differences 
between entitlement and actual supply.”82 Further, the EIR did not 
provide any evidence to support the assertion that the SWP could supply 
100 percent of entitlements in wet years, and 50 percent in extreme 
drought years.83 
The real party in interest in this case attempted to show that there 
was sufficient information regarding the availability of SWP entitlements 
by pointing to various documents in the record, including a report in an 
appendix and information submitted by project opponents, but without 
arrangements for allocating water shortages. These arrangements, the court explained, would carry 
forward the fiction that actual water molecules were available to support the full SWP “entitlements” 
mentioned in various water supply agreements between DWR and its contractors: 
Paper water always was an illusion. “Entitlements” is a misnomer, for contractors surely 
cannot be entitled to water nature refuses to provide or the body politic refuses to harvest, 
store, and deliver. Paper water represents the unfulfilled dreams of those who, steeped in the 
water culture of the 1960’s, created the expectation that 4.23 maf of water could be delivered 
by a SWP built to capacity. . . . DWR and the contractors have forsaken their expectation that 
the SWP facilities will be built as planned and will deliver 4.23 maf of water annually. . . . 
Indeed, fiscal and environmental pressures militate against completion of the project. 
. . . . 
. . . [L]and use decisions are appropriately predicated in some large part on assumptions 
about the available water supply. There is certainly the possibility that local decision makers 
are seduced by contractual entitlements and approve projects dependent on water worth little 
more than a wish and a prayer. 
Planning & Conservation League, 83 Cal. App. 4th at 914-15 & n.7 (emphasis added). 
In making the pronouncements quoted above, the court of appeal, in effect, warned land use 
planners across California – particularly in areas, such as much of Southern California, currently 
served by the SWP – that they must not be “seduced” by SWP “paper water” that may never become 
available. Thus, although the holding of the Planning & Conservation League decision will not 
affect day-to-day land use planning, the Planning & Conservation League decision nevertheless 
demands local agencies’ attention. These agencies ought not plan for new development based on 
paper water supplies that may never materialize. 
 79 SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th at 721. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 722. 
 83 Id. 
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serious response.84 The court reasoned, however, that “[i]t is not enough 
for the EIR simply to contain information submitted by the public and 
experts. Problems raised by the public and responsible experts require a 
good faith reasoned analysis in response.”85 The EIR in this case did not 
contain such good-faith reasoning. According to the court, “[w]ater is too 
important to receive such cursory treatment.”86 
The court also briefly explained that the fact that a project may not 
record a tract map until an adequate supply of water is demonstrated did 
not excuse the inadequacies in the EIR itself.87 Again, the court noted 
that “[a]n EIR’s purpose is to inform,” and emphasized that this purpose 
“is not satisfied by simply stating information will be provided in the 
future.”88 Even if supplies will be obtained in the future, the EIR must 
contain adequate information about supplies currently available, as well 
as disclose the likelihood of the actual availability of future supplies. 
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the court’s analysis 
focused on the fact that SWP entitlements played a significant role in the 
EIR’s consideration of water supply for the project. A quirk of history 
and California water supply planning resulted in a situation where many 
water suppliers hold “paper water.”89 The opinion concluded with the 
observation that: 
 [T]he EIR fails to undertake an adequate analysis of how much water 
the SWP can actually deliver in wet, average and dry years. Without 
such information, the general public and its responsible officials 
cannot make an informed decision on whether to approve the project. 
The County’s approval of the West Creek EIR is not supported by 
substantial evidence.90 
The court’s holding in SCOPE I could, therefore, be read narrowly 
to require only that, for projects dependent on SWP supplies, EIR 
preparers must fully disclose the fact that paper SWP “entitlements” are 
not the same as actual water supplies and must provide specific evidence 
regarding the availability of real SWP water. A somewhat broader 
interpretation can be drawn, however, from the court’s statement, at the 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 723. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 721. 
 90 Id. at 724. 
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very beginning of the opinion, that “[a]n environmental impact report for 
a housing development must contain a thorough analysis that reasonably 
informs the reader of the amount of water available.”91 Even this 
statement, however, could be narrowly construed to suggest that such 
analysis is necessary only for projects that both (i) propose housing and 
(ii) require an EIR.92 
While the facts in SCOPE I involve the unique nature of SWP 
entitlements, the court’s reasoning could be understood to apply by 
analogy to other situations in which vagaries of climate, infrastructure 
limitations, or quirks of California water law make water supplies 
unreliable or questionable. Language within the opinion supports a 
broader interpretation, as do the policies underlying CEQA and, more 
importantly, the later pronouncements of the California Supreme Court 
in Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth. 
The statement quoted above, for example, that an EIR must contain 
a “thorough analysis that reasonably informs the reader of the amount of 
water available” did not specifically limit such analysis to the amount of 
water available from SWP entitlements.93 Indeed, the court stressed that 
“[t]o be adequate, the EIR must include sufficient detail to enable those 
who did not participate in its preparation to understand and 
‘meaningfully’ consider the issues raised by the proposed project.”94 
Notably, SWP entitlements are not the only area of California water law 
that involves a degree of uncertainty. 
Riparian and overlying rights, for example, have been described as 
major sources of uncertainty in California law.95 As explained by the 
California Supreme Court: 
[a] riparian owner has no right to any mathematical or specific amount 
of the water of a stream as against other like owners. He has only a 
right in common with the owners to take a proportional share from the 
stream — a correlative right which he shares reciprocally with the 
other riparian owners. No mathematical rule has been formulated to 
determine such a right, for what is a reasonable amount varies not only 
with the circumstances of each case but also varies from year to year 
 91 Id. at 717. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 721. 
 95 In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 354-55 (1979). 
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and season to season.96 
Rights to groundwater are also correlative and are thus subject to 
similar limitations.97 According to the logic of the court’s decision in 
SCOPE I, an EIR that relies on such uncertain sources must explain the 
uncertainty and provide substantial evidence for any assumptions 
regarding supply availability.98 This broader interpretation is consistent 
with CEQA policies requiring that an EIR include sufficient detail to 
permit informed decisionmaking.99 More importantly, though, this 
broader interpretation accords with the principles set forth in Vineyard 
Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, which are discussed in detail 
below, after consideration of the one other intervening CEQA water 
supply case. 
E. CALIFORNIA OAK FOUNDATION V. CITY OF SANTA CLARITA 
The next installment of the Castaic Lake Water Agency’s water 
saga was reported in California Oak Foundation v. City of Santa 
Clarita.100 In that case, the court found that the EIR for the proposed 
project was inadequate because the document failed to disclose that the 
project’s prospective water supply was uncertain, failed to describe the 
nature and extent of the uncertainty, and—perhaps most importantly—
failed to realistically analyze the availability of water to serve the project 
given these uncertainties.101 
Before reaching the merits, the court summarized a series of 
published decisions from the courts of appeal that it considered highly 
relevant to water supply issues in this case. First, in Planning & 
Conservation League v. Department of Water Resources,102 the court 
 96 Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 559-60 (1944). 
 97 Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001 (Ct. 
App. 1975). 
 98 SCOPE I, 106 Cal. App. 4th at  721-24; see also Save Our Peninsula Comm. v. Monterey 
County Bd. of Supervisors, 87 Cal. App. 4th 99, 131-34, 143 (Ct. App. 2001) (remanding EIR for 
housing project for, among other things, further discussion of alleged “subterranean riparian water 
rights” claimed by applicant). 
 99 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061 (Westlaw 2009) (“The purpose of an [EIR] is to 
provide public agencies and the public in general with detailed information about the effect which a 
proposed project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of 
such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a project.”). 
 100 Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 101 Id. at 1244. 
 102 Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892 (Ct. App. 
2000). 
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struck down the EIR for the Monterey Agreement, which revised 
allocations of water from the SWP between agricultural and urban 
contractors and allowed for voluntary transfers of water 
“entitlements.”103 The court made several comments, essentially in dicta, 
that have been frequently cited by other courts and thus have proven to 
be key concerns for water purveyors using SWP water. The court said 
that SWP “entitlements” were established on the assumption that the 
entire SWP would be constructed to enable delivery of about 4.2 million 
acre-feet of water per year.104 In fact, though, the SWP was never 
completed, is not expected to be completed, and can only deliver about 
half of that amount.105 As such, SWP “entitlements” are essentially half 
water and half “paper.”106 
Second, in Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water 
Agency (Friends of the Santa Clara River I),107 Castaic Lake Water 
Agency (“Castaic”) certified an EIR and entered into an agreement to 
purchase 41,000 acre-feet per year (AFY) from the Kern County Water 
Agency pursuant to the Monterey Agreement.108 Ultimately, the court 
struck down the EIR because it “tiered” off the Monterey Agreement 
EIR that had been invalidated by the court in Planning & Conservation 
League.109 The court allowed Castaic to use the water from Kern 
County—apparently on Castaic’s declaration that the 41,000 AFY was 
absolutely needed to serve existing water supply demands—but left 
open, until Castaic properly complied with CEQA, the question whether 
such supplies might be relied on to approve new development.110 
Third, in SCOPE I,111 the court held the EIR for a mixed-use project 
in the Santa Clarita Valley was inadequate because the water supply 
analysis relied on “paper water” from the SWP, a fiction criticized by the 
Planning & Conservation League court.112 In SCOPE I, the EIR failed to 
undertake an adequate analysis of the amount of water the SWP could 
 103 Id. at 897-98. 
 104 Id. at 908 n.5. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373 
(Ct. App. 2002). 
 108 Id. at 1375. 
 109 Id. at 1375-76. 
 110 Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 1238 nn.15 & 16 (Ct. 
App. 2005). 
 111 Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE I), 106 Cal. 
App. 4th 715 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 112 Id. at 721. 
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actually deliver in wet, average, and dry years.113 
Fourth, in Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water 
Agency (Friends of the Santa Clara River II),114 the court held that the 
urban water management plan (“UWMP”) prepared by Castaic did not 
comply with the statutory requirements for such a plan because the 
document did not adequately describe the reliability of groundwater 
supplies in light of perchlorate contamination located in groundwater.115  
While the UWMP mentioned that a groundwater cleanup plan was being 
developed, the document did not discuss whether the plan had been 
completed, or the date when the plan would be completed and 
implemented.116 Moreover, the UWMP did not state how fast the 
perchlorate contamination was spreading, or how any uncertainty on 
timing issues would affect the reliability of the supply of groundwater.117 
These cases form the legal backdrop of the court’s decision in 
California Oak Foundation. In that case, the respondent city certified an 
EIR for a 161-acre industrial park.118 The industrial park would be 
constructed on previously undeveloped property and would require about 
386 AFY of water.119 The EIR identified Newhall County Water District 
as the agency that would serve the project with water.120 Newhall, 
however, is only a water retailer; it gets its water from the Castaic, which 
in turn gets its water from the SWP and from groundwater.121 Castaic 
claims entitlements to about 95,200 AFY of water from the SWP; 
additionally, it claims groundwater supplies of between 8,000 AFY and 
85,700 AFY.122 Castaic estimated that over the next twenty years, water 
demand in the area would be about 75,100 AFY.123 Assuming that 
groundwater was available only at the lower figure, 8,000 AFY, Castaic 
estimated that it would have a water supply surplus of about 28,100 AFY 
in the twenty-year planning horizon.124 According to the draft EIR, the 
project’s demand of roughly 386 AFY would easily be accommodated 
 113 Id. at 724. 
 114 Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 123 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 115 Id. at 14. 
 116 Id. at 12-13. 
 117 Id. at 13. 
 118 Cal. Oak Found. v. City of Santa Clarita, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1219, 1225 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 119 Id. at 1224, 1231. 
 120 Id. at 1232. 
 121 Id. at 1227. 
 122 Id. at 1229, 1230-31 n.11. 
 123 Id. at 1230-31. 
 124 Id. 
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within Castaic’s “surplus” supply.125 
Petitioners argued that the EIR was inadequate because it did not 
fairly describe the actual water supply available to serve the project. 
Specifically, petitioners argued that the EIR was defective because (1) it 
failed to acknowledge that 41,000 AFY of Castaic’s SWP “entitlements” 
were entangled in litigation and might not be available in the future, (2) it 
failed to acknowledge that half of Castaic’s entire 95,200 AFY SWP 
“entitlements” was merely “paper water” rather than actual water likely 
to be available for delivery to serve the project, and (3) it failed to 
acknowledge the extent to which groundwater supplies would be 
unavailable due to perchlorate contamination.126 The court agreed with 
the first two contentions.127 
One of the prevailing themes in the opinion is that water supply 
vulnerabilities must be fully disclosed in an EIR, and the effect of that 
vulnerability on supply reliability must be evaluated. The court explained 
that one of the primary purposes of an EIR “is to reveal to the public ‘the 
basis on which its responsible officials either approve or reject 
environmentally significant action,’ so that the public, ‘being duly 
informed, can respond accordingly to action with which it disagrees.’”128 
“[T]o be adequate, the EIR must include sufficient detail to enable those 
who did not participate in its preparation to understand and 
‘meaningfully’ consider the issues raised by the project.”129 “This 
standard is not met in the absence of a forthright discussion of a 
significant factor that could affect water supplies.”130 “[T]he EIR is 
intended to serve as an informative document to make government action 
transparent. Transparency is impossible without a clear and complete 
explanation of the circumstances surrounding the reliability of the water 
supply.”131 
The court first addressed the reliability of the 41,000 AFY of SWP 
entitlements, which Castaic acquired, indirectly, from the Kern County 
Water Agency.132 Petitioners argued that the EIR was inadequate 
 125 Id. at 1231. 
 126 Id. at 1236, 1241-42. 
 127 Id. at 1244. 
 128 Id. at 1237 (quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 392 (1988)). 
 129 Id. at 1237 (quoting Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los 
Angeles (SCOPE I), 106 Cal. App. 4th 715, 721 (Ct. App. 2003).). 
 130 Id. at 1237. 
 131 Id. at 1237-38. 
 132 Id. at 1236. 
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because the EIR, without analysis or discussion, relied on Castaic’s 
41,000 AFY entitlement to SWP water despite the fact that the EIR for 
Castaic’s purchase of the entitlement was decertified133 in Friends of the 
Santa Clara River I134. The court agreed: “the EIR does not ‘directly 
address’ the issue, which arose when [Friends of the Santa Clara River I] 
was decided in January 2002, contemporaneously with circulation of the 
draft EIR. The final EIR contains an inadequate discussion—in fact, no 
discussion at all—of the uncertainty surrounding the transfer of the 
41,000 AFY entitlement. The text of the EIR does not mention the 
decertification of the EIR for the Castaic purchase . . . .”135 
The court went on to note that an appendix buried at the end of the 
final EIR did to some degree address these issues, but the court held this 
discussion was inadequate.136  Acknowledging in an appendix to the 
final EIR that the 41,000 AFY was in doubt, and that, absent this water, 
supplies might not be sufficient, was “too little and too late . . . . We are 
troubled by the fact that the only discussion in the EIR of the uncertainty 
created by the decertification of the EIR for the Castaic purchase appears 
in an appendix added to the final EIR shortly before certification. The 
seriousness of water supply issues . . . merits discussion in the text of the 
EIR, where it is most readily accessible.”137 At a minimum, the court 
held, the information should have been contained in an appendix that was 
actually referenced in the text of the EIR.138 The court further chided the 
City for failing to explain the possible limitations on the water 
entitlements because of ongoing legal challenges: “Without a discussion 
of the nature of the limitations, . . . it is impossible to know the contours 
of the potential limitation on the water supplies.”139 In other words, the 
City had to go beyond simply acknowledging the deficiency; the City 
had to take the additional step of discussing the likelihood of the deficit 
and alternative sources of water supply to meet the deficit.140 
Moreover, while the final EIR appendix acknowledged uncertainty 
as to whether the 41,000 AFY purchased from Kern would be available, 
the final EIR concluded supplies would nevertheless be adequate for the 
 133 Id. 
 134 Friends of the Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 
1388 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 135 Cal. Oak Found., 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1236. 
 136 Id. at 1239. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 1238. 
 140 Id. at 1239. 
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project because Castaic held entitlements for 56,800 AFY of SWP water, 
independent of the water it obtained from the Kern County Water 
Agency.141 The court was troubled that the draft EIR gave “no hint” that 
SWP entitlements cannot be taken at face value.142 While the final EIR 
acknowledged elsewhere that the SWP entitlements would be available 
at a 50% level 80% of the time and at a 37% level about 20% of the time, 
the EIR failed to discuss the import of these admissions.143 Moreover, 
the EIR appendix made misleading comments that contradicted these 
admissions.144 As noted above, the final EIR appendix reasoned that the 
56,000 AFY of SWP entitlements exceeded by 18,844 AFY Castaic’s 
existing demand for 35,356 AFY of water.145 These figures assumed that 
the full entitlement would be delivered. In fact, employing the agency’s 
own estimates, Castaic could expect only about 28,000 AFY of its entire 
56,000 AFY entitlement to be delivered the majority of the time.146 Thus, 
absent the 41,000 AFY from the Kern County Water Agency, Castaic 
would already be seriously short of water to meet even its existing 
demand.147 
The court concluded that the final EIR contained no substantial 
evidence or analysis indicating that there was adequate water to serve the 
project “in light of the uncertainty flowing from the decertification of the 
EIR for the Castaic purchase.”148 The absence of this information 
undermined the information functions of the EIR for the project and 
required decertification of the EIR: “[W]ithout the 41,000 AFY 
entitlement, substantial evidence of sufficient water supplies simply does 
not exist.”149 
The court upheld, however, the EIR’s discussion of perchlorate 
contamination of groundwater.150 The draft EIR had not mentioned 
perchlorate contamination; however, it did rely on and incorporate by 
reference Castaic’s UWMP, which noted that the discovery of such 
contamination could affect groundwater supply availability.151 The court 
 141 Id. at 1233. 
 142 Id. at 1238. 
 143 Id. at 1239. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1239. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1240. 
 149 Id. at 1242. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
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concluded that the City had discretion to rely on the information in the 
UWMP, in large part because the court’s ruling in Friends of the Santa 
Clara River II,152 which found the plan deficient under the Water Code, 
came after the EIR was certified.153 The court described the City’s 
victory on this issue as Pyrrhic, however, because the court’s ruling on 
the 41,000 AFY transfer from the Kern County Water Agency had “the 
practical effect of requiring the City to come to grips with the perchlorate 
issue as well, because reliance on groundwater supplies will acquire 
additional significance if less imported water is available” from the 
SWP.154 
F. VINEYARD AREA CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH, INC. V. 
CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA 
In a landmark decision addressing the intersection of CEQA and 
water supply analysis for major development projects, the California 
Supreme Court pulled together the threads of court of appeal case law 
discussed above.155 In doing so, the high court created a very significant 
precedent that now represents the single most significant EIR case for 
CEQA practitioners to study carefully. 
Factually, the Supreme Court held that the EIR for the “Sunrise 
Douglas Community Plan” and the “SunRidge Specific Plan” in what 
was now the City of Rancho Cordova contained an adequate analysis of 
near-term water supplies.156 The court also held, however, that the EIR 
did not provide an adequate analysis of long-term supplies needed to 
serve the community plan, together with other anticipated development 
in the area.157 The court also held the agency should have recirculated the 
Draft EIR to disclose impacts from groundwater pumping on listed 
species.158 A detailed discussion of the facts of Vineyard will help to 
understand the legal principles announced in the opinion. 
A coalition of landowners proposed to develop 6,000 acres in 
southeastern Sacramento County, in an area subsequently annexed to the 
 152 See generally Friends of the Santa Clarita River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 123 Cal. 
App. 4th 1, (Ct. App. 2004). Parenthetical explantion is encouraged after see generally 
 153 Cal. Oak Found., 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1243. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40 Cal. 
4th 412 (2007). 
 156 Id. at 421. 
 157 Id. at 444-45. 
 158 Id. at 448-49. 
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City of Rancho Cordova.159 The Sunrise Douglas Community Plan 
proposed 22,000 residential units, as well as office, industrial and public 
uses.160 The coalition also proposed the SunRidge Specific Plan – a 
subset encompassing 2,600 acres and 9,886 residential units to be 
developed as an initial phase of the project.161 The County prepared an 
EIR analyzing the impacts of implementing both plans.162 The County 
Board of Supervisors certified the EIR and approved the plans.163 A 
coalition of citizens’ groups (the “Citizens”) sued, and the trial court and 
court of appeal denied the petitions.164 The California Supreme Court 
granted a petition for review on two issues: (1) the adequacy of the EIR’s 
water supply analysis, and (2) impacts of groundwater pumping on the 
Cosumnes River.165 
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the County’s water supply 
analysis focused on two distinct aspects of the EIR: (1) the analysis of 
near-term water supplies needed to serve the Specific Plan, and (2) the 
analysis of long-term supplies necessary for the entire Community 
Plan.166 
To serve the initial phase of the project, as embodied in the Specific 
Plan, the EIR stated that the project would rely on a newly developed 
“North Vineyard Well Field” located southwest of the project area.167 
This well field could safely yield up to 10,000 acre-feet annually.168 The 
Sacramento County Water Agency would make this water available on a 
first-come-first-served basis to the SunRidge and Sunrise Douglas areas, 
and to other anticipated development in the area.169 The record showed 
this new well field would initially connect solely to the project area, 
whose developers would pay a fee to compensate any nearby well 
owners harmed by pumping; and other near-term development would 
require only 3,000 AFY, leaving the balance – 7,000 AFY – to meet the 
anticipated demand of 5,500 AFY from the SunRidge Specific Plan 
 159 Id. at 421. 
 160 Id. at 422. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 421. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 436, 438. 
 167 Id. at 423. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 436. 
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area.170 Thus, the court observed, “[w]hile much uncertainty remains, . . . 
the record contains substantial evidence demonstrating a reasonable 
likelihood that a water source the provider plans to use for the Sunrise 
Douglas project . . . will indeed be available at least in substantial part to 
supply the Sunrise Douglas project’s near-term needs.”171 The EIR did 
not defer analysis of the impacts of developing these supplies, or rely on 
demonstrably illusory supplies.172 Nor did the EIR need to demonstrate 
certainty regarding the project’s future water supplies.173 To the extent 
anticipated water supplies did not materialize, or the agency proposed 
new or different supplies, the agency could perform supplemental 
analysis to address changes to the project or to the circumstances 
surrounding the project.174 
With respect to long-term water supplies intended to serve the 
Community Plan as a whole, the court found that the record contained 
substantial evidence supporting the County’s conclusion that up to 
15,000 AFY in new surface-water diversions from the American River – 
so-called “Fazio water” – would be available to serve the project.175 The 
problem, however, was that the Final EIR’s discussion of total long-term 
water supply and demand in the broader region “leaves too great a degree 
of uncertainty regarding the long-term availability of water for this 
project. Factual inconsistencies and lack of clarity in the FEIR leave the 
reader―and the decision makers―without substantial evidence for 
concluding that sufficient water is, in fact, likely to be available for the 
Sunrise Douglas project at full build out.”176 
The EIR’s analysis stated that long-term water demand in “Zone 
40” – a large swath of southeastern Sacramento County that included the 
Community Plan area – would be approximately 113,000 AFY at build-
out of the general plan.177 Another EIR prepared to analyze the impacts 
of increased diversions from the American River – the “Water Forum 
EIR” – had estimated Zone 40 demand at 87,000 AFY at build-out.178 
The Sunrise Douglas EIR did not explain the reason for this 
 170 Id. at 436-37. 
 171 Id. at 437. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 438. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 439. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
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balan
 
discrepancy.179 
On the supply side, the Sunrise Douglas EIR stated that surface-
water deliveries would total roughly 64,000 AFY; elsewhere, the same 
EIR estimated new surface-water deliveries at 45,000 AFY.180 The Water 
Forum EIR stated that up to 78,000 AFY in new surface water would 
become available.181 Again, the Sunrise Douglas EIR did not explain 
why these numbers differed.182 In adopting findings approving the 
Community Plan, the County used the Final EIR’s estimated demand of 
113,000 AFY and estimated surface-water supply of approximately 
64,000 AFY, but it did not explain the differing estimates.183 Although 
such an explanation might have existed, it did not appear in the Final 
EIR.184 
Nor did the EIR explain how the this gap – 113,000 AFY in Zone 
40 demand, versus approximately 64,000 AFY in new surface-water 
supplies – would be bridged.185 When commentators pointed out this 
gap, the Final EIR responded that “new surface water supplies are to be 
used conjunctively with groundwater supplies.”186 This explanation, 
however, was too “vague and unquantified” to be relied upon, because it 
did not explain how groundwater and surface water would be managed 
during wet and dry years to bring long-term demand and supply into
ce.187 
The Final EIR stated a full analysis of the conjunctive use program 
would be included in the environmental analysis prepared for the Water 
Agency’s Zone 40 Master Plan Update, which was pending at the time 
the County released the Sunrise Douglas Final EIR.188 The court rejected 
this approach, stating that the County could not avoid its obligation to 
analyze the likely water sources for the Sunrise Douglas Community 
Plan by referring to a future report; rather, the County either had to 
include its analysis in the Sunrise Douglas EIR, or had to await the 
completion of the master plan updated analysis, and then tier off it.189 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 439-40. 
 184 Id. at 440. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 440-41. 
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ptimistic numbers from the Sunrise Douglas and 
Wate
ikely to fully serve this 
extra
itigation measures identified in the Water Forum 
Prop
 
Nor was it apparent how the 10,000 AFY in new groundwater would 
bridge the gap between surface-water supplies and anticipated demand, 
even using the most o
r Forum EIRs.190 
The County did not need to demonstrate with certainty that the total 
anticipated water supply would be sufficient to meet total demand at 
build-out.191 “But CEQA did require that the FEIR show a likelihood 
water would be available, over the long term, for this project. Without an 
explanation that shows at least an approximate long-term sufficiency in 
total supply, the public and decision makers could have no confidence 
that the identified sources were actually l
ordinarily large development project.”192 
The real parties in interest pointed to a discussion in the Water 
Forum proposal for additional details regarding how the conjunctive use 
program would be implemented.193 The Sunrise Douglas EIR, however, 
did not spell out how the EIR related to, incorporated by reference, or 
tiered off the Water Forum proposal or accompanying EIR.194 Thus, the 
EIR did not provide an adequate road map to the information or analysis 
drawn from other documents.195 Nor did the EIR expressly incorporate 
the impacts and m
osal’s EIR.196 
The real parties also pointed to the Final EIR’s “mitigation measure 
WS-1.”197 This measure stated that entitlements for development within 
the Sunrise Douglas Community Plan would not be granted without 
“firm proof of available water supplies” at each phase of development.198 
According to the court, a measure of this sort could serve to supplement 
an EIR’s water supply analysis.199 Under CEQA, however, it could not 
substitute for such an analysis. Indeed, in order to rely on such a 
measure, the EIR would have to “discuss the probability that the intended 
water sources for later phases of development will not eventuate, the 
environmental impacts of curtailing the project before completion, and 
 190 Id. at 441. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 193 Id. at 442. 
 194 Id. at 442-43. 
 195 Id. at 443. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. at 444. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
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uglas EIR was inadequate because it did not 
inclu
supply analysis for a large-scale, long-term 
development project: 
 the competing water demands 
ssociated with such development.202 
oposed project, but also other 
lanned development in the area.205 
mitigation measures identified in the 
IR that is being relied upon.206 
ose mitigation for “the environmental 
effects of such truncation.”207 
 
mitigation measures planned to minimize any such significant 
impacts.”200 The Sunrise Do
de such an analysis.201 
The court provided the following summary of the requirements for 
an adequate water 
(1) The EIR must contain information on planned long-term 
development in the area and identify
a
 
(2) The EIR must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of adequate 
long-term supply by showing “a rough balance between water supply 
and demand.”203 If, “despite a full discussion, it is impossible to 
confidently determine that anticipated future water sources will be 
available, CEQA requires some discussion of possible replacement 
sources or alternatives to use of the anticipated water, and of the 
environmental consequences of those contingencies.”204 The estimate 
of demand must include not only the pr
p
 
(3) To the extent the EIR relies upon water-supply analyses prepared 
for other projects (such as the Water Forum EIR in this case), the EIR 
must adhere to the rules governing tiering and incorporation by 
reference. Among other things, the EIR for the development project 
must incorporate and adopt the 
E
 
(4) Although an agency may rely on a provision calling for curtailing 
the later stages of development if water supplies do not materialize, 
the EIR must disclose or prop
The court then turned to the recirculation issue. The so-called 
Revised Recirculated Draft EIR, which the County prepared after the 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 445. 
 203 Id. at 445-46. 
 204 Id. at 432 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 446. 
 207 Id. at 447. 
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 County adopted this conclusion in 
its fi
ave recirculated the analysis in the Final EIR to 
addr
 
first proposed well field ran into regulatory problems and was replaced 
by a different proposed well field, stated that the Cosumnes River was 
located south of the second proposed well field but did not otherwise 
analyze impacts of groundwater extraction on river flows or habitat.208 
Several agencies and other commentators expressed concern that 
groundwater extraction would decrease summertime flows in the river 
and have an adverse impact on steelhead and Chinook salmon migration 
through the area.209 The Final EIR responded to these comments by 
stating that the change in groundwater elevations in the area would be no 
more than two feet.210 The Final EIR concluded that the resulting impact 
on river flows would be restricted to low-flow periods, would be limited 
to changing the timing and areal extent of the dewatering of the river, 
and would not be significant.211 The
ndings approving the project.212 
The court held that substantial evidence did not support this finding 
because the Final EIR disclosed a potentially significant impact 
associated with reduced river flows on aquatic species, including 
migrating salmon.213 The Final EIR’s response conceded groundwater 
extraction during low-flow periods could lengthen the period during 
which the Cosumnes River was dewatered and thus could hinder fish 
migration.214 Moreover, the migratory reach of the river overlapped with 
the area potentially affected by project-related pumping.215 For this 
reason, the response did not constitute substantial evidence that the loss 
of stream flows would have no adverse impact on salmon migration, and 
the County should h
ess this issue.216 
Justice Baxter concurred with the majority’s opinion that the EIR 
contained an adequate analysis of the SunRidge Specific Plan’s near-
term water supply.217 He dissented, however, from the majority’s opinion 
regarding the EIR’s analysis of long-term water supplies.218 In Justice 
 208 Id. at 424. 
 209 Id. at 425. 
 210 Id. at 425-26. 
 211 Id. at 426. 
 212 Id. at 448. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 449. 
 217 Id. at 450. 
 218 Id. at 451. 
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e project, but also for all 
conceivable development in the region.219 
G. 
ENVIRONMENT V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES (SCOPE II) 
in. The trial court had denied the 
petit
or Responsible Growth. The court 
distilled those principles as follows: 
ons of supplying the 
mount of water” that the project will need.225 
is of future phases cannot be entirely avoided at the 
 
Baxter’s view, the majority erred by requiring the EIR to analyze long-
term water supplies not merely for th
SANTA CLARITA ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING THE 
In Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. 
County of Los Angeles (SCOPE II),220 the court of appeal reviewed the 
new EIR prepared on remand from the decision in SCOPE I in light of 
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth.221 Still not satisfied 
with the new EIR, the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the 
Environment (“SCOPE”) had sued aga
ion, and SCOPE had appealed.222 
SCOPE challenged the adequacy of the new EIR’s water supply 
analysis as it related to a water-transfer agreement between the Castaic 
Lake Water Agency and the Kern County Water Agency (the “Kern-
Castaic transfer”).223 The new EIR indicated that this transfer would 
provide 41,000 acre-feet per year, a significant portion of the supplies 
needed for the various projects slated for the Santa Clarita Valley, 
including the West Creek project.224 The court of appeal evaluated this 
claim in light of four principles articulated by the California Supreme 
Court in Vineyard Area Citizens f
(1) The EIR must contain sufficient information to allow 
decisionmakers to “evaluate the pros and c
a
 
(2) The EIR for a large land use plan, to be built out over the course of 
years, cannot limit its water-supply analysis to initial phases. Although 
tiering principles can be used to defer some details to future phases, 
the analys
 219 Id. at 452-53. 
 220 Santa Clarita Org. for Planning the Env’t v. County of Los Angeles (SCOPE II), 157 Cal. 
pp. 4 ). 
ly id. 
t 154. 
A th 149 (Ct. App. 2007
 221 See general
 222 Id. at 152. 
 223 Id. a
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. at 158. 
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utset.226 
rcumstances affecting the likelihood of 
e water’s availability.227 
owever, cannot substitute entirely for 
analyzing alternative sources.230 
Castaic transfer as part of the permanent supply 
for th
 
o
 
(3) “[T]he future water supplies identified and analyzed must bear a 
likelihood of actually proving available; speculative sources and 
unrealistic allocations (‘paper water’) are insufficient.” The EIR must 
include a discussion of the ci
th
 
(4) “Where, despite a full discussion, it is impossible to confidently 
determine that anticipated future water sources will be available,” the 
EIR must identify and analyze the impacts of developing replacement 
or alternative sources of water.228 The agency can include a measure 
curtailing development in the event water sources do not 
materialize.229 Such a measure, h
The court held the EIR prepared for the West Creek project adhered 
to these principles.231 First, the EIR did not ignore or assume a solution 
to the problem of supplying water to the project. Rather, the EIR 
identified specific water sources, including the Kern-Castaic transfer.232 
Second, the EIR did not limit its analysis to the first development phase, 
but considered the Kern-
e entire project.233 
With respect to the third principle, SCOPE argued that uncertainties 
surrounding the Monterey Agreement litigation threatened the reliability 
of the Kern-Castaic transfer.234 That litigation had resulted in 
invalidating the EIR for the Monterey Agreement between the 
Department of Water Resources and various water districts to allocate 
water from the State Water Project.235 That litigation, in turn, resulted in 
invalidating an EIR that tiered off the Monterey Agreement EIR that was 
prepared to analyze the impacts of Kern-Castaic water transfer.236 Since 
 226 Id. at 158-59. 
t 159. 
 Planning & Conservation League v. Dep’t of Water Res., 83 Cal. App. 4th 892 (Ct. 
pp. 2
e Santa Clara River v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 95 Cal. App. 4th 1373, 
 227 Id. a
 228 Id. 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 See
A 000). 
 236 Friends of th
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ertified a new EIR for the Kern-Castaic 
trans
sting that the Department of Water Resources 
oppo
ransfer would be 
avail
 
then, the parties to the Planning & Conservation League litigation had 
entered into a settlement agreement.237 In addition, the Castaic Lake 
Water Agency had prepared and c
fer, which had provoked another lawsuit.238 
The EIR responded to this uncertain state of affairs by noting that, 
even if the litigation resulted in setting aside the Monterey Agreement, a 
court was unlikely to require the parties to unwind other agreements 
(such as the Kern-Castaic transfer agreement, which had not been set 
aside in the aftermath of Friends of the Santa Clara River I).239 Existing 
law and contracts authorized the transfer, even without relying on the 
Monterey Agreement.240 Although the settlement agreement arising out 
of the Monterey Agreement litigation did not identify the Kern-Castaic 
transfer as a permanent transfer, nothing suggested that the parties to the 
Agreement considered the transfer to be temporary.241 Nor did the record 
contain evidence sugge
sed the transfer.242 
SCOPE argued the West Creek EIR improperly tiered off a future 
EIR – in this case, the new EIR to be prepared for the Monterey 
Agreement after the old one was invalidated in the PCL litigation.243 The 
court disagreed, noting that the West Creek EIR did not tier off future 
Monterey Agreement environmental documents; rather, the West Creek 
EIR’s water supply analysis was based on the premise that the Monterey 
Agreement litigation was unlikely to affect the Kern-Castaic transfer.244 
Thus, the record contained substantial evidence demonstrating a 
reasonable likelihood that water from the Kern-Castaic t
able for the project’s near- and long-term needs.245 
As to the fourth principle, SCOPE argued that West Creek EIR 
failed to analyze the project’s water supply in the absence of the Kern-
1388 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 237 Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 180 Cal. App. 4th 210 
t. A
h at 154; Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake 
ater
II, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 160; see Friends of the Santa Clara River, 95 Cal. App. 
I, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 160. 
 
t 162. 
(C pp. 2009). 
 238 See SCOPE II, 157 Cal. App. 4t
W  Agency, 180 Cal. App. 4th 210. 
 239 SCOPE 
4th at 1388. 
 240 SCOPE I
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. at 161-62.
 244 Id. a
 245 Id. 
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ed, the 
Kern
 
this water, local water purveyors had placed a high priority on installing 
sory, 
notw
H. 
 
Castaic transfer.246 Under Vineyard, the EIR had to acknowledge such 
uncertainty, regardless of the reason for it; thus, legal uncertainty had to 
be considered.247 As the court noted, however, “[t]he water is now 
available, and for years has been available for the project under executed 
agreements.  The [West Creek] EIR notes that the Kern-Castaic transfer 
can legally occur without the Monterey Agreement. Suffice it to say, 
however the Monterey Agreement litigation is eventually decid
-Castaic transfer will likely not be affected. Per the fourth principle, 
we can confidently determine that the water will be available.”248 
Turning to groundwater, SCOPE argued the West Creek EIR was 
deficient because it did not discuss the impact of inadequate funding to 
remediate contaminated water wells.249 The EIR stated some water 
would be supplied from two local aquifers tapped by 67 wells.250 The 
record showed that six of these wells were contaminated with 
perchlorate, and the estimated cost of remediation was $500,000 per 
well.251 The EIR did not identify a source of funding to carry out the 
remediation.252 The EIR did state, however, that due to the high value of
wellhead treatment.253 Nothing suggested remediation was illu
ithstanding its cost.254 
IN RE BAY-DELTA PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
REPORT COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS 
In another major decision dealing with the intersection of water 
supply and CEQA, the California Supreme Court upheld the CEQA 
analysis for the so-called “CALFED project.” 255 The high court’s 
 246 Id. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. at 162-63. Notably, more than two years after publication of the SCOPE II decision, the 
court of appeal for the same appellate district – the Second – upheld the adequacy of the second EIR 
prepared by Castaic for the 41,000 AFY transfer, retroactively validating the optimism reflected in 
the EIR at issue in SCOPE II. See Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, 
180 Cal. App. 4th 210 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 249 SCOPE II, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 163. 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. 
 255 In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proceedings, 43 Cal. 4th 
1143 (2008). 
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various 
poten
diversion 
proje
exports is not optimal; and levees 
throu
In 1994, the CALFED program was established as a cooperative 
 
opinion in In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Environmental Impact Report 
Coordinated Proceedings addressed consolidated CEQA challenges to 
the CALFED Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement and 
Environmental Impact Report (“PEIS/R”).256 In summary, the Supreme 
Court held that the CALFED PEIS/R was not required to include an 
analysis of a possible project alternative that, by reducing existing water 
exports from the southern part of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River 
Delta to agricultural and urban users in the San Joaquin Valley and 
Southern California, would not have met one of the project’s primary 
objectives of water supply reliability.257 The court also held that 
generalized analyses of the environmental effects of both 
tial additional long-term water supply sources and the 
“Environmental Water Account” (“EWA”) were sufficient in light of the 
programmatic, first-tier character of the document.258 
The Bay-Delta estuary is created by the convergence of California’s 
two largest rivers, the Sacramento and the San Joaquin, which terminate 
in the San Francisco Bay.259 As the court noted, “the Bay-Delta’s 
watershed encompasses 37 percent of the state’s surface area, and its 
average annual in-flow is 22 million acre-feet of water . . . .”260 The Bay-
Delta supplies water throughout California via two major water-
cts, the Central Valley Project (“CVP”) and the State Water Project 
(“SWP”).261 The two projects export an average of 5.9 million acre-feet 
of water each year, primarily for agricultural and urban uses.262 
The Bay-Delta faces significant water supply and water quality 
challenges in addition to broader environmental degradation.263 More 
specifically, the ecology of the estuary has long been in decline; water 
exports have grown increasingly unreliable due to these environmental 
concerns; the water quality of 
ghout the Delta could collapse in an earthquake, creating a water 
supply crisis for much of California, as export pumps would be 
inundated with brackish water.264 
 256 Id. at 1152. 
 257 Id. at 1143, 1152. 
 258 Id. at 1169. 
 259 Id. at 1151. 
 260 Id. at 1152. 
 261 Id. at 1154. 
 262 Id. at 1154-55. 
 263 Id. at 1156. 
 264 Id. 
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Decision for the program.  As envisioned at the 
time
he Supreme 
Cour
 
effort of eight California agencies and ten federal agencies to develop 
and implement long-term solutions to the problems facing the Bay-
Delta.265 The program was divided into three phases. Phase I defined the 
problems facing the Bay-Delta and analyzed a wide range of alternatives 
for potential solutions.266 Phase II added further “program elements” to 
the previously identified potential alternatives analysis and was the 
subject of two draft PEIS/Rs.267 In the summer of the year 2000, at the 
end of Phase II, the lead agency on the project, the California Resources 
Agency, certified the final PEIS/R, and the CALFED agencies together 
issued a Record of 268
, Phase III would implement the preferred alternative identified in 
the final PEIS/R.269 
Two lawsuits were filed challenging the CALFED PEIS/R for 
alleged noncompliance with CEQA and were subsequently consolidated 
in Sacramento County Superior Court.270 The trial court ruled that the 
CALFED PEIS/R satisfied the requirements of CEQA; the court 
therefore denied the two petitions for a writ of mandate.271 The Third 
District Appellate Court reversed that judgment, however, and instructed 
the trial court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate due to what the 
appellate court considered to be three violations of CEQA.272 First, 
according to the court of appeal, the PEIS/R improperly failed to include 
a full discussion of an alternative to the CALFED Program that would 
reduce water exports from the Bay-Delta to CVP and SWP facilities to 
the south.273 Second, the court thought that the PEIS/R lacked an 
adequate analysis of the environmental impacts of diverting (and 
exporting) additional water from various potential sources.274 And third, 
the PEIS/R, the intermediate court said, did not include sufficient 
information detailing impacts associated with the EWA.275 T
t reversed and held that the CALFED final PEIS/R for the Bay-
 265 Id. 
 266 Id. at 1157. 
 267 Id. at 1159. 
 268 Id. at 1160. 
 
t 1161. 
 269 Id. 
 270 Id. at 1160-61.
 271 Id. a
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
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’s water supply objective, to include a water-use-
effic
at such an alternative would 
not 
 
Delta complied with CEQA as to all three of these issues.276 
One of the primary objectives of the CALFED project was to 
improve water supply reliability by reducing the mismatch between 
supply and demand for Bay-Delta water (most water in California comes 
from streams flowing into the Delta, while most of the water demand 
occurs in areas far to the south).277 Even so, CALFED studied a reduced 
exports alternative during Phase I of the project.278 This reduced export 
alternative was not carried over into Phase II, however, and thus was not 
included in the formal alternatives analysis portion of the PEIS/R.279 
This omission reflected the CALFED agencies’ conclusion that a 
reduced export alternative would not meet the water supply objective of 
the project.280 These agencies instead opted, as part of the strategy for 
meeting CALFED
iency program in each of the alternatives that were carried forward 
in the PEIS/R.281 
The Supreme Court held that “CALFED properly exercised its 
discretion when it declined to carry the reduced export alternative over 
for detailed study in the final PEIS/R after concluding that such an 
alternative would not achieve the CALFED Program’s fundamental 
purpose and thus was not feasible.”282 In support of its conclusion, the 
court relied on the “rule of reason,” which provides that an EIR need 
only analyze “those alternatives necessary to permit a reasoned 
choice.”283 The rule of reason also allows lead agencies to eliminate from 
consideration alternatives that would not “feasibly obtain most of the 
basic objectives of the project.”284 Here, the court determined the 
exclusion of the reduced export alternative was consistent with the rule 
of reason in light of CALFED’s finding th
achieve the water supply reliability objective, which the court 
considered a “basic goal” of the project.285 
The Supreme Court also determined that, in finding a need for a 
reduced export alternative, the court of appeal had erroneously given too 
 276 Id. at 1152. 
 277 Id. at 1157. 
 278 Id. at 1164. 
 279 Id. at 1164-65; see CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.6 (2010). 
 280 In re Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1164. 
AL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.6(f) (2009). 
lta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1166. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Id. at 1166. 
 283 See C
 284 Id. 
 285 In re Bay-De
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ourt 
acknowledged that laws other than CEQA (e.g., the state and federal 
enda
oals and 
meet current and projected water export demands, and that will 
provide balanced progress in all four of the program areas.291 
much weight to preexisting adverse environmental conditions in the Bay-
Delta.286 The Supreme Court pointed out that the purpose of the EIR 
under CEQA is to analyze the environmental effects of the proposed 
project.287 Regardless of how severe they may be, preexisting 
environmental conditions are considered part of the baseline conditions 
against which the effects of the project are assessed, and such existing 
problems must be distinguished from the new effects that a project may 
cause.288 The court of appeal reasoned that the reduced export alternative 
may have been the best alternative to address preexisting environmental 
conditions and thus should have been included in the PEIS/R.289 In 
contrast, the Supreme Court found that those preexisting conditions 
would continue regardless of the CALFED program and were therefore 
part of the baseline under CEQA.290 Notably, however, the high c
ngered species acts) might someday lead to diminished exports: 
As the CALFED PEIS/R itself recognizes, Bay-Delta ecosystem 
restoration to protect endangered species is mandated by both state 
and federal endangered species laws, and for this reason water exports 
from the Bay-Delta ultimately must be subordinated to environmental 
considerations. The CALFED Program is premised on the theory, as 
yet unproven, that it is possible to restore the Bay-Delta’s ecological 
health while maintaining and perhaps increasing Bay-Delta water 
exports through the CVP and SWP. If practical experience 
demonstrates that the theory is unsound, Bay-Delta water exports may 
need to be capped or reduced. At this relatively early stage of program 
design, however, we conclude that CALFED properly applied the rule 
of reason when it decided to consider in the PEIS/R only alternatives 
that have the potential to both achieve ecosystem restoration g
 
 286 Id. at 1167. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id.; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15125(a). 
 290 In re Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1168. 
 291 Id. at pp. 1168-69 (emphasis added). There is no indication that the Supreme Court shared 
the al 
ma of 
Ap
 court of appeal’s view that a reduction of exports would necessarily translate, as an empiric
tter, into reduced population growth in California. On that subject, the Third District Court 
peal had said the following: 
In order to meet the water supply reliability objective of the Program, all of the alternatives 
proposed in the PEIS/R call for increased exports of water to areas south of the Delta, or at 
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The final consideration with regard to the missing reduced export 
alternative related to the adverse environmental effects associated with 
water-storage facilities and dam construction.292 On that subject, the 
Supreme Court held that “although the PEIS/R did not analyze a reduced 
exports alternative, it did analyze no-additional-storage alternatives that 
would avoid any adverse environmental consequences of constructing 
new dams or enlarging existing ones. Under CEQA, this was 
sufficient.”293 The court also explained that no new water-storage 
facilities were included in the CALFED project as of the completion of 
Phase II, emphasizing that any proposed facilities would be subject to 
least no reduction in the amount of water exported. . . . However, a reasonable alternative to 
this approach would be to reduce the amount of water exported south of the Delta, thereby 
een Bay-Delta water supplies and beneficial 
 it could satisfy the other Program goals. 
ination, water will become more expensive to obtain and California’s appeal will 
s supplied, population growth would be affected accordingly, leading to less 
edings, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 696, 
C  Cal. 4th 1143 (2008). 
 Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1168. 
reducing the amount of water that must be redirected from other users or impounded in new 
or existing reservoirs. Although such an alternative would not completely satisfy the 
CALFED goal of reducing the mismatch betw
uses,
 
  The feasibility of such a reduced exports alternative is clear, notwithstanding the projected 
population growth that undergirds the commitment not to reduce exports. As stated 
previously, it is projected that the state’s population will grow from 30 to 49 million by the 
year 2020, and that half of this growth will be in Southern California. Such population 
growth requires water. However, if there is no water to support the growth, will it occur as 
projected? Population growth is not an immutable fact of life. Stable populations have been 
established in such states as New York, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Inflow 
of new residents to California continues to exceed outflow because conditions in the State are 
conducive to population growth. One aspect of these conditions is the availability of water. 
However, as the State reaches the limit of available water and must seek other sources such 
as desal
lessen. 
 
  Years ago some argued that people should follow the water, not vice versa. While it is not 
the function of this court to advocate one position or the other, this argument nevertheless 
points out a glaring defect in the PEIS/R. CALFED conducted its environmental analysis by 
assuming certain population growth in the State over the next 15 years and then finding ways 
to provide water to that population. But CALFED appears not to have considered, as an 
alternative, smaller water exports from the Bay-Delta region which might, in turn, lead to 
smaller population growth due to the unavailability of water to support such growth. Taking 
an assumed population as a given and then finding ways to provide water to that population 
overlooked an alternative that would provide less water for population growth leaving more 
for other beneficial uses. CALFED apparently assumed that the California population would 
grow as projected regardless of the availability of water and did not consider whether, if less 
water wa
demand. 
In re Bay-Delta Programmatic Envtl. Impact Report Coordinated Proce
774 ( t. App. 2005) (citation omitted), rev’d, 43
 292 In re
 293 Id. 
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eneral terms, without 
the l
 CALFED agencies properly chose to defer site-specific 
revie
 
later, lower-tier environmental review.294 
The CALFED PEIS/R included a general discussion of the potential 
sources of water that the project would require.295 The document did not 
undertake, however, detailed environmental-impact analysis of diverting 
water from each of the potential sources (e.g., “enlarging Shasta Lake, 
expanding the Los Vaqueros reservoir, and constructing an in-Delta 
storage facility”).296 Rather, the PEIS/R stated that specific analyses of 
the water sources would be included in second-tier environmental 
reviews and were not appropriate at this stage of planning.297 The court 
of appeal found that deferring the identification and CEQA analysis of 
specific sources of water violated CEQA, citing the Stanislaus Natural 
Heritage Project decision.298 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that 
“at the first-tier program stage, the environmental effects of obtaining 
water from potential sources may be analyzed in g
evel of detail appropriate for second-tier, site-specific review. The 
CALFED PEIS/R satisfies these requirements.”299 
CALFED is a multi-stage program that will be implemented over a 
thirty-year period.300 The specific sources of water to supply the project 
have not yet been identified.301 Distinguishing the facts at issue in 
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rancho 
Cordova, the court held that it was appropriate for CALFED to defer 
detailed analysis of the environmental effects until CALFED has 
identified the specific sources of water that will someday augment 
existing exports from the CVP and SWP.302 Because detailed 
environmental review at the Phase II stage would be speculative and 
inefficient, the
w of the potential water sources to second-tier environmental 
documents.303 
Moving on to the final issue it addressed, the court noted that the 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. at 1169. 
 296 Id. at 1168 n.8. 
 Cal. App. 4th 351 
t. A y-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1171-72). 
 Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th at 1172. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. at 1171. 
 299 Id. at 1169; see also Rio Vista Farm Bureau Ctr. v. County of Solano 5
(C pp. 1992) (cited with approval in In re Ba
 300 In re
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. at 1170. 
 303 Id. at 1172. 
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d that, because the PEIS/R did not discuss the 
EWA
 
wate
ards, the kind of 
detailed analysis demanded by the various petitioners was simply not 
 meet applicable CEQA standards. 
 
EWA is a part of CALFED’s ecosystem restoration strategy.304 The 
EWA allows the agencies to “acquire, bank, transfer and borrow water” 
to protect fish habitat without reducing deliveries to water users.305 
CALFED identified the EWA as a second-tier project and thus discussed 
its environmental effects only in general terms in the PEIS/R.306 The 
EWA was discussed in greater detail in a document entitled “California’s 
Water Future: A Framework for Action” (“Action Framework”).307 The 
Action Framework was released before the certification of the PEIS/R.308 
The court of appeal hel
 in what it considered to be sufficient detail, the document failed to 
comply with CEQA.309 
The Supreme Court disagreed and found that the PEIS/R had 
adequately addressed the EWA by discussing its effects in general terms 
and deferring a more detailed analysis to a second-tier CEQA 
document.310 The EWA is a statewide program that will eventually 
require various water-acquisition projects that, as of the year 2000, had 
not yet been identified. Thus, until specific water-acquisition projects 
were identified, the general discussion of the EWA in the PEIS/R was 
sufficient to satisfy CEQA.311 Furthermore, the court held, the specific 
details discussed in the Action Framework were not required in a first-
tier CEQA analysis.312 As the court explained, “[t]he PEIS/R fulfills the 
function of a first tier document because it analyzes the environmental 
impacts of the mechanisms that will establish and develop the EWA –
r transfers (including purchases from willing sellers), reservoirs, 
groundwater storage, and more flexible operations of water projects.”313 
In summary, the court upheld the PEIS/R against three broad-based 
attacks, in each instance emphasizing the programmatic character of the 
document and the fact that, under applicable legal stand
necessary in order to
 304 Id. at 1173-74. 
 305 Id. at 1174. 
 306 Id. at 1173. 
 307 Id. at 1174. 
 308 Id. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Id. at 1175. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. 
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ween water supply and land use 
plann
o 
past societal failures to sufficiently account for environmental concerns 
in the design of major water storage and delivery systems. Water issues 
will only grow more complex as water resources become less plentiful. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
As California’s population has continued to grow, creating an ever-
greater demand for development, the Legislature and courts have 
struggled with addressing the nexus bet
ing. This effort has been no simple feat and has occurred against 
the backdrop of ever-increasing uncertainties about the reliability of 
water supplies in the state. 
Nevertheless, after over two decades of appellate decisions dealing 
with EIR challenges for substantial development projects, the California 
Supreme Court weighed in, announcing a set of legal principles and 
requirements that local agencies should follow in addressing water 
supply issues within EIRs for such projects. Although the Vineyard Area 
Citizens for Responsible Growth decision helped to clarify principles 
previously found only within a sometimes confusing array of court of 
appeal decisions, the rules announced by the Supreme Court are easier to 
articulate than to satisfy in practice. Without doubt, the water-related 
challenges facing California after the first decade of the twenty-first 
century will likely continue to tax the creativity and intelligence of the 
environmental consultants and planners charged with preparing EIRs, of 
agency decisionmakers faced with demands for new development, and of 
members of the public. The coming years will see a reduction in water 
resources, due to a reduced snowpack resulting from climate change, as 
well as the continuing deterioration of aquatic ecosystems attributable t
42
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